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Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 128 S. Ct. 2131 (2008).
LAW: The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2008), provides a private right of
action for any individual injured in either his property or business
due to a violation of § 1962 (which contains RICO's criminal
provisions). An individual may sue in the United States District
Court and may recover three times the damages, plus reasonable
attorney's fees.
FACTS: The Cook County Treasurer's Office annually holds a
property auction in which it sells liens it has acquired from
delinquent taxpayers. The prospective buyers do not bid in cash
amounts; instead, they bid a percentage of the penalties due to the
County. The property owner must pay the winning bidder in order to
clear the tax lien. The bidder willing to accept the lowest percentage
of the penalties wins the ability to purchase the lien on the property
and pay the owed taxes. The original owner of the property may
purchase his property back by paying the lien-holder the late taxes,
plus the percentage paid to win the auction, and an additional twelve
percent penalty on any other taxes paid by the lien-holder. If the
property owner does not pay these fees within a certain time period,
then the lien-holder may obtain a tax deed on the property, which
essentially gives them ownership of the property. To prevent bidders
from sending multiple agents to bid on the same property, the County
adopted a "Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule." This rule prohibits
agents of buyers from being used. In addition, the bidder must
submit bids in their own name and not in a third party's name.
Moreover, if there are multiple bids at a zero percent rate, the County
will allocate property on a rotating basis.
Both the Petitioner and the Respondent are regular bidders in these
auctions. The Respondent brought suit against the Petitioner,
alleging Petitioner had violated the "Single, Simultaneous Bidder
Rule." Petitioner, Sabre Group LLC and its principal officer
Rochman, arranged for other competing firms to bid in their name, so
as to have multiple zero percent bids on several properties; thus,
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causing them to have a disproportionate share of the properties won
at the zero percent rate.
ANALYSIS: The Court first addressed the Petitioner's alleged
violations of RICO. Petitioner submitted multiple bids in violation of
the "Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule" and sent notice of their bids
to the property owners by mail. Together, the mailings allegedly
amounted to racketeering activities. Respondents were injured by
losing the right to acquire liens on various parcels of property.
Petitioner argued it was the County who received the fraudulent
misrepresentations and not the Respondents; thus, no reliance by the
Respondents existed. The Court rejected this argument and reasoned
that RICO does not mention a first-party reliance requirement.
Furthermore, the Court explained that a person may be injured
because of mail fraud, even if the person does not rely on the mail
fraud for any significant reason.
The Court gave a flexible definition of proximate cause, stating that
the actual definition of what will constitute proximate cause varies
case-by-case. The Court further recognized that in common law
fraud, reliance on the misrepresentation is necessary in order to have
a cause of action. The issue, however, is mail fraud, which is a civil
RICO claim, not common law fraud. The Court added that the only
person who can be injured from a fraudulent misrepresentation is the
person who relies on it. In this case, Respondent was injured because
of the County's reliance on the fact that the Petitioners were only
bidding for themselves and not as part of a scheme to acquire a larger
share of the property at the auction. The Court declined to narrow
possible RICO claims and stated that they will give deference to
Congress in certain situations.
HOLDING: The Court held that a plaintiff asserting a RICO claim
based on mail fraud does not need to show reliance on the
defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations as either an element of the
claim itself or as an element necessary for proximate cause.
IMPACT: This holding has the potential to broaden the bases under
which a federal RICO claim can be brought by a person who has
suffered injury at the hands of another. Because a plaintiff does not
need to show actual reliance on the defendant's fraudulent
misrepresentations, they may be able to bring claims they were
unable to bring before. The Court did recognize that there will often
be other events which may displace the importance of a party's
reliance, such as if the County had known about the fraudulent claims
by the Petitioner in this case and still allowed them to participate in
the auctions. Potential plaintiffs in a federal RICO claim, however,
only have to show that someone relied on the fraudulent
misrepresentations, not themselves personally, thus opening the door
for more litigation.
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ga. State Bd. of Equalization, 128 S. Ct. 467
(2007).
LAW: The Railroad Revitalization Regulatory Reform Act (Act), 49
U.S.C. § 11501 (2008), provides that the states may not assess
railroad property at a higher ratio to the fair market value of the
property than the ratio of other commercial property's fair market
value.
FACTS: CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX) had multiple railroad
routes across the state of Georgia; making it subject to Georgia's ad
valorem property tax. Although local county boards assess other
commercial and industrial properties' value, railroad property is
assessed by the State. The State's assessment is then submitted to the
local county board for acceptance or alteration. In 2001, the Georgia
State Board of Transportation (Board) placed a $4.6 million tax
liability on CSX's property. The following year, a different method
of assessment was used, which increased the fair market value of
CSX's property by approximately forty-seven percent, to $6.5
million. CSX filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia, claiming that its property was taxed at a
ratio five percent higher than other similar commercial and industrial
property. The District Court rejected CSX's argument and the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
ANALYSIS: The Court first addressed the Board's argument that
there is a clear distinction between the State's valuation methods and
their applications. The Court rejected this argument, stating that
appraisers often employ several methods to determine the true fair
market value (as there is no fixed market value for any type of
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property). These methods often produce vast differences in appraisals
and the reviewing court must use the methods employed to determine
whether the fair market value reached is fair. If the reviewing court
were only to see the value and not the methods employed, the statute
would likely be rendered inoperable. The courts would be forced into
accepting the final value, since there would be no fixed, standard fair
market value to measure it against. The Board next argued that a
state's ability to assess taxes should be interfered with as little as
possible by federal law. The Court rejected this argument,
reaffirming the importance of ensuring that states treat railroads
fairly and do not discriminate unfairly against them. The Court
emphasized that a state may employ whatever valuation methods it
desires, so long as they are not discriminatory in nature against the
railroads.
HOLDING: Railroads may challenge the methods employed by the
states in determining the value of railroad property as well as the
state's application of these methods.
IMPACT: While the states may argue that this decision impedes on
the state's ability to determine taxing rates, it merely ensures that
discrimination will not be used against the railroads in assessing
property value. The states are still free to select their valuation
measure to determine the fair market value of properties, but they
cannot employ methods which would treat railroads differently from
other commercial properties.
Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 128 S. Ct. 2007 (2008).
LAW: The Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (2008)
permits a winning party in a lawsuit involving the United States
government to recover reasonable fees and other costs in connection
with a proceeding before a governmental administrative agency. For
the most part, these fees are based on the prevailing market rate for
the particular type of service involved.
FACTS: Richlin Security Service Company (Petitioner) was hired
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to provide guards for
detainees at the Los Angeles International Airport. By mutual
mistake, the contract misclassified the guard employees, and the
Department of Labor ordered Petitioner to pay back-pay under the
Service Contract Act of 1965. Petitioner filed a petition with the
Board of Contract Approvals of the Department of Transportation to
reform the contract to make the Government responsible for all
additional costs under the Service Contract Act. The Board ruled in
its favor, and included that Petitioner could not recover paralegal fees
at the billing rate, but solely at the cost to their attorneys. The
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Board's decision and
the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.
ANALYSIS: The Government argued that the statute distinguished
fees from other expenses, and that costs incurred by paralegals
should be measured at the cost to the attorneys, rather than at the
prevailing market rate. The Court disagreed with both arguments,
stating that there is no distinguishing between fees and other
expenses. In fact, Congress even uses the terms interchangeably.
Furthermore, the Court equated paralegal fees to attorney's fees,
which are measured at the market rate, rather than to costs from
studies, analyses, and other reports. The Court also rejected the
Government's argument that charging market rates for paralegal
services would cause attorneys to give more work to their paralegals,
with the intention that they could recover a higher percentage rate of
their market value. This is because the Government makes no
distinction between junior attorneys and senior attorneys, the latter of
whom charge a higher rate.
HOLDING: The Supreme Court held that a prevailing party in a
lawsuit involving the United States government may recover
paralegal fees at the prevailing market rate.
IMPACT: Because fees are recoverable at market rates for virtually
all parties involved in litigating a lawsuit before an administrative
agency, parties which are brought before the agencies may be more
likely to bring lawsuits, because they are now able to recover more of
their litigation expenses. The Government may now think twice
before bringing an action against a party, because the Government
will now be responsible for more litigation costs. This could
decrease the amount of actions brought before an administrative
agency, as well as allow parties brought before an administrative
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agency to feel more secure that, if they are victorious, they can
recover their costs at a fair market value.
Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 128 S. Ct. 989 (2008).
LAW: Maine Revised Statute Annotated, Title 22 § 1555-C(1) and
Title 22 § 1555-C(3) forbids anyone other than a Maine-licensed
tobacco retailer from accepting a tobacco delivery. Furthermore, the
statute requires that when a licensed retailer accepts or sends tobacco,
the retailer must use a service that provides a type of recipient
verification. In addition, no person can knowingly transport a product
containing tobacco to another person in Maine unless either the
sender or recipient has a Maine license.
FACTS: The New Hampshire Motor Transport Association filed
suit, claiming that federal law pre-empts the Maine Statutes. The
District Court and Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed.
ANALYSIS: The Court referred to the interpretation of the Airline
Deregulation Act in Morales v. Trans. World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S.
374 (1992), which held that when the Court interprets a statutory
provision and settles on its meaning, it is inferred that if the language
is repeated in another statute, it also carries with it the judicial
interpretation of that statute. The Court found that Morales applied
to the case at bar because it indirectly involved motor carrier services
by requiring a certain type of delivery service for the transport of
products using tobacco. The Court stated that if they were to allow
Maine to require special shipping measures, the Court would have to
allow other states to do the same, which would create a disjointed
system, and would defeat all congressional desire to leave matters
such as this up to the market when there are no federal regulations in
place. Maine argued that federal law does not pre-empt state law
when the state is working to protect its citizens' health. The Court
rejected this argument because the statute did not provide a public
health exemption and Congress' concern was with the economy, not
with state health provisions.
HOLDING: The Court held that federal law pre-empted the Maine
Statutes in both Maine's efforts to regulate carrier services and its
attempt to institute consumer-protection laws.
IMPACT: This decision may decrease the state's influence in
economic areas involving common carriers. It may also decrease the
number of areas in which states may use the public health exemption
to justify regulations. The Court's holding, however, leaves open
other areas of economic regulations to the state because the decision
explicitly eliminates only regulations involving common motor
carriers.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FEDERAL CIRCUIT
GHS Health Maint. Org., Inc. v. United States, 536 F.3d 1293
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
LAW: 48 C.F.R. § 1652.216-70(b)(6) provides that in the event that
a contract between the government and an insurance carrier is not
renewed past the initial term, neither party is allowed any adjustment
of claim for the difference between the subscription rate prior to rate
reconciliation and the actual subscription rate.
FACTS: GHS Health Maintenance Organization, Inc. (GHS) had
formally contracted with the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) to provide health benefits to federal employees and federal
retirees under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program.
Through the use of 5 U.S.C. § 8902(i), Congress directed the OPM to
calculate rates at a basis which would reasonably reflect the actual
cost of the benefits provided by the plan. Under this direction, the
OPM negotiates annually with the insurance provider for rates in a
two-step process. First, the insurance provider calculates a reasonable
estimate for what it would charge "similarly sized subscriber groups"
(SSSG) for the same services during a year. Second, the OPM and
the carriers try to reconcile these estimates with the actual rates the
insurance providers are charging for their services. If the costs are
higher than the estimate, the provider will reimburse the OPM, and if
they are lower, the OPM will pay the difference to the provider.
Neither party, however, receives any additional money during the
final year in which the contract is valid due to the Nonreconciliation
Regulation (48 C.F.R. § 1652.216-70(b)(6)). GHS sued the
government, claiming the Nonreconciliation Regulation violated 5
U.S.C. § 8902.
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ANALYSIS: The Court addressed the question of whether or not the
Nonreconciliation Regulation is valid. The Court applied the two-
part test established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). First, the reviewing
court must look to see whether congressional intent was clear for
enacting the statute. If it is clear, the court must defer to this
interpretation. If it is not clear, the court should move on to whether
or not the agency interpretation of the statute was reasonable and
based on an acceptable construction of the statute.
The Court first stated that Congress had not directly spoken to the
question at issue. The statute at issue does not mention
reconciliation, nor can any inference be made from the statute. The
Court proceeded to step two and concluded that Congress intended to
leave the steps the OPM can take in establishing rates wide open,
thereby allowing the OPM to establish their own requirements. Any
regulation that comes out of the OPM under this rulemaking
provision is binding, unless the reviewing court finds it to be
procedurally defective, vastly conflicting with the statute, or
"arbitrary and capricious" under United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218 (2001). The Court found that the way the OPM determines
rates takes into account factors that Congress did not intend,
including a reasonable profit by the insurance provider. Thus, even
though the OPM tried to ensure reasonable rates by having the
insurance provider charge rates similar to what they would charge
non-governmental agencies, they still took into effect what a
reasonable profit would be by offering to reimburse the provider if
the actual costs were lower than the estimated costs.
Moreover, the fact that the Nonreconciliation Regulation treats the
costs differently in the final year than in other years of the contract
directly undermines the congressional mandate found in 5 U.S.C. §
8902, which states that the rates be determined at a reasonable and
equitable rate. The Court further stated that the congressional intent
was not to ensure that the OPM received rates comparable to that of
SSSGs. In addition, the Court gave two reasons why the regulation is
considered arbitrary and capricious. First, the OPM cannot articulate
a reason why the regulation was initially enacted. Second, even if
there was a problem that the regulation was designed to address, the
connection between the problem and the proposed solution is not
solid enough to sustain the regulation. The Court further held that
the OPM's claim that they could not obtain sufficient data to support
their regulation is not a compelling reason to sustain the regulation.
HOLDING: The Court invalidated the OPM's Nonreconciliation
Regulation, because it was arbitrary and capricious and directly
conflicted with 5 U.S.C. § 8902.
IMPACT: This seems to take some authority away from federal
agencies in determining rules by which Congress gave them broad
authority. The decision also demonstrates that Chevron deference is
alive and well. An agency must be guided by some principles when
making decisions; thus, agencies cannot have open-ended authority
when enacting rules based on statutory authorization.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, NINTH CIRCUIT
Tablada v. Thomas, 533 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2008).
LAW: Title 18 U.S.C. § 3624 provides that a prisoner serving a
prison sentence of more than one year may receive credit towards the
service of the entire sentence, beginning at the end of the first year of
the term. The credit may be up to fifty-four days per year of the term
of imprisonment (beyond time-served).The Bureau of Prisons
(Bureau) determines the credit given. The credit awarded during the
last year of the prison term must be pro-rated and credited during the
last six weeks of the sentence. The Bureau's interpretation of § 3624
is provided by 28 C.F.R. § 523.20, which states that the fifty-four day
credit will be available for each year served.
FACTS: Petitioner is an inmate at an Oregon prison who was
sentenced to a twenty-year prison term for a narcotics charge.
Petitioner filed an amended writ of habeas corpus challenging the
calculation of his "good time" credit.
ANALYSIS: The Court stated that § 523.20 was entitled to
Skidmore deference, because the section was adopted through the
Administrative Procedure Act's notice-and-comment procedure. The
Court determined that it was not eligible under Chevron deference
because the Bureau's interpretation of § 3624 did not carry the force
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of law; thus, Skidmore should apply instead. Under Skidmore, the
reviewing court examines certain factors, including the rational
validity of the agency's decision and whether the agency has
consistently applied its rationale to the application of the statute. The
Court deferred to the Bureau's interpretation of the statute. Under
the Petitioner's argument, he could have received up to 540 days and
an additional 54 days after only serving 111 days; thus, giving a
"windfall." The Court stated that Congressional intent was to have
the statute interpreted so as to be equitable in nature; therefore, the
pro-rated scheme would better serve the intent.
The Court recognized that the Bureau consistently applied the
standard for sixteen years. Furthermore, even though the Petitioner
and others had presented a reasonable interpretation of the statute,
deference had to be given to the Bureau's interpretation. Petitioner
finally argued that the correct interpretation of the statute belonged to
the United States Sentencing Commission, which proscribed that
good time credit be given on 15% of the length of the sentence. The
Court struck down this argument, holding that the Sentencing
Commission had never objected to the Bureau's interpretation and
that the Bureau itself, not the Sentencing Commission, is responsible
for the determination of good time credit.
HOLDING: The Ninth Circuit held the Bureau's interpretation of §
3624 reasonable and held that proper deference should be given to
the interpretation under the Skidmore doctrine.
IMPACT: The Court reached a standardized guideline for the
Bureau of Prisons for determining the amount of good time credit a
prisoner is able to earn. It also clearly indicated that the Bureau is
responsible for the determination of good time credit and not the
United States Sentencing Commission, which seemingly institutes
the pro-rated standard for determining good time credit without
negotiation.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, TENTH CIRCUIT
Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 531 F.3d
1220 (10th Cir. 2008).
LAW: The Roadless Area Conservation Rule of 2001 (RAC), 36
C.F.R. § 294.12(a)-(b), provides for the prohibition of road
construction and the harvesting of timber and other construction in
"inventoried roadless areas" (IRA) which are under the National
Forest Service's control unless they fall within an exemption,
including for public health and safety or for a restoration action. The
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 40 C.F.R. §
1508, states that federal agencies must disclose through
environmental impact statements (EIS), the possible impacts their
actions and any connected actions may have on the environment.
FACTS: SG Interests, Ltd. sought authorization from the United
States Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to construct and operate
a natural gas pipeline on BLM land. Following the request, BLM
engaged in an environmental analysis to determine what effect the
proposed pipeline would have on surrounding areas. BLM then
issued a Record of Decision (ROD) authorizing a thirty year, fifty
foot construction right of way for the pipeline, as well as temporary
use permits and road use permits. The construction was scheduled to
last three years and the right of way was to be rehabilitated, but no
more trees would be allowed to grow and all motor vehicles would be
permanently restricted. Plaintiffs filed an action alleging that the
ROD violated both the United States Forest Service's RAC and
NEPA and also filed for an injunction barring SG Interests from
constructing the pipeline.
ANALYSIS: BLM claimed that it could issue the ROD because the
pipeline could be built without any road construction. The Plaintiffs
claimed this decision by BLM was arbitrary and capricious. The
Court rejected this argument, because Plaintiffs chose to believe
BLM's definition of "travelway" in the RAC, as excluding any areas
that were to be used for construction zones necessary for the pipeline.
The RAC provides that IRAs may be used for other uses and
construction zones do not necessarily have to be roads.
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NEPA contains a provision whereby agencies must deal with the
"cumulative impact" of any proposed action. This provision ensures
that an agency cannot take an action that would result in a substantial
environmental impact and divide it into separate actions, which
individually have minimal environmental impact. Next, the
reviewing court is supposed to apply an "independent utility" test,
whereby the court must look to see whether or not one of the smaller
actions would have any utility on its own, or if it needs to be
combined with another event in order for it to serve an independent
function. BLM decided the potential natural gas well developments
were not connected actions with the construction of the pipeline. The
Court recognized that the development of natural gas wells may
become more attractive to developers with the installation of the
pipeline, but further recognized that it was impossible to state with
any certainty that development would actually occur. Furthermore,
the Court stated there has been increased development of natural gas
in the area of the pipeline due to increased national demand for
natural gas. Thus, additional infrastructure to support the
transportation of gas would be a result and not a cause of the
development.
HOLDING: The Court did not grant the Plaintiffs motion for
preliminary injunction, holding that BLM correctly considered the
possible environmental impact under NEPA. In addition, the
definition of "travelway" under RAC correctly excluded construction
right of ways.
IMPACT: This holding has the ability to undermine the importance
of EIS assessment because a potentially certain event from the result
of a federal agency action now does not have to be considered when
applying the requirements of NEPA. Moreover, the narrow
interpretation of the definition of "travelway" in the RAC,
specifically excluding construction right of ways, has the potential to
exclude other conveyances which normally would be considered
roads.
ARKANSAS STATE COURT
Arkansas Beverage Retailers Ass'n. Inc. v. Moore, 256 S.W.3d
488 (Ark. 2008).
LAW: Arkansas Annotated Code § 3-4-218 prohibits (post-February
18, 1971) liquor permits from being issued or transferred to any non-
liquor store. A non-liquor store is a store that sells alcohol, in
addition to its main sales item of food or other products.
FACTS: The Arkansas Beverage Retailers Association, Inc.
appealed an Arkansas Circuit Court decision, which dismissed the
Association's petition for judicial review of an Arkansas Alcoholic
Beverage Control Board's (AABC) decision. AABC approved an
application for the transfer of beer and liquor permits on behalf of
Sam's Club. The permits were originally granted to a liquor store
and AABC decided it would be more of a public convenience to
allow Sam's Club to directly sell liquor.
ANALYSIS: The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the Appellants
had standing due to the difficulty of its retailers (members) to
compete. The Court stated that as long as a person believes his or her
rights were sufficiently harmed, he or she has a personal stake in the
result of a claim and will suffer real and immediate injury. Thus,
there is sufficient standing. The Court believed Appellants had
demonstrated this in their petition because the immediate injury
would be the fact that Sam's Club would be able to sell other retail
goods and its members would suffer because they were unable to sell
these other retail goods in addition to liquor. Furthermore,
Appellants successfully demonstrated disparate treatment under the
statute.
HOLDING: The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the circuit
court's reasoning that Appellants had suffered a sufficient injury to
justify standing under the Code, as its members were unable to
compete on equal footing with retail outlets which were able to sell
other goods besides liquor. Moreover, when a state court is
confronted with a standing question that the federal Administrative
Procedure Act addresses, the reviewing court does not need to turn to
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the federal act. Instead, the court may rely on the state's applicable
administrative procedure act or other areas of law.
IMPACT: This decision has the ability to broaden an association's
standing in cases involving its members. A perceived possibility of
an economic harm is now sufficient to claim standing in an action
against an administrative agency. In addition, the case limits the
AABC's discretionary role in deciding who receives liquor permits,
by taking away some discretion when future harm may occur.
COLORADO STATE COURT
Colo. Citizens for Ethics in Gov't v. Comm. for the Am. Dream,
187 P.3d 1207 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
LAW: The Colorado Constitution, article XXVIII, section
2(7)(b)(III) provides that an electioneering communication does not
include any communication issued or made during the regular course
and scope of business. The Colorado Fair Campaign Practices Act
§§ 1-45-109(5), 1-45-109(5)(c) states that the Secretary of State's
office will provide all filed reports to the public via a website which
shall allow residents to search the reports. In addition, one such
search function should be the name of the candidate.
FACTS: The Committee for the American Dream (CAD) is a
Colorado-registered political committee that supports political
candidates with a pro-business and pro-property mindset. CAD is
solely funded by contributions from the Colorado Association of
Home Builders (CAHB). During the November 2006 election, CAD
funded television commercials opposing John Kefelas, a Colorado
House of Representatives incumbent seeking re-election. CAD
contracted with Rock Chalk Media (Rock) to produce commercials
and Rock contracted with Comcast Spotlight to broadcast the
commercials. CAD filed reports with the Colorado Secretary of State
for all contributions they received, as well as all expenditures they
made in 2006, including those made to Rock. They did not file,
however, itemized reports of the contributions made by CAHB, nor a
"separate electioneering communications report," which would have
named Kefelas as the target of their commercials. The Colorado
Citizens for Ethics in Government (CCEG) filed a complaint alleging
CAD violated the Colorado Constitution Art. XXVIII and the Fair
Campaign Practices Act (FCPA). The Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) found that CAD violated the electioneering communication
reporting requirement when it did not name Kefelas as the target, and
also held that CCEG's accusations regarding membership
contributions filing were groundless and fined them because of this.
ANALYSIS: The Court first addressed the issue arising under
Colorado Constitution Article XXVII, §2(7)(b)(III) when it was
asked to clarify the definition of what constitutes a business. The
Court rejected the ALJ's decision to make the distinction of whether
an entity is a business based on their profit or non-profit status.
Instead, the Court chose to define a business according to the purpose
intended by the legislature. The Court discussed the reasons why
Colorado voters adopted the article, including the desire to limit
special interests' influence over the political process; current
campaign financing requirements frustrated by large increases in
electioneering communications; the public interest best served by the
enforcement of limits on campaign financing; and full disclosure of
political advertisements. The Court found CAD did not fall within
the business exception because its advertisements were meant to
influence the 2006 election. An exception could not be made for
every broadcaster or other provider of media just because they
provide media communications within the normal scope of their
business. Providing media communications to the public is their
business and to allow them to be exempt from the electioneering
communication requirement would frustrate the purpose of the
article.
The Court found that CCEG's claim CAD violated the FCPA Rule
9.3 and Colorado Constitution Article XXVIII, § 6(1), because CAD
did not disclose the name of the candidate in the electioneering
report. The Court struck down CAD's counter-argument that the
Secretary of State unlawfully adapted FCPA Rule 9.3 because it was
out of his normal rule-making abilities. The Court stated that
administrative rules carry with them a presumption of validity and
will not be struck down unless the party challenging the rule has
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the rule should be invalidated.
FCPA Rule 9.3 provides that the name of the candidate referred to in
the electioneering communication should also be included in the
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electioneering report. The Court found that FCPA Rule 9.3 was
within the Secretary of State's purview to enforce, because it was
within the Secretary's ability to proscribe any rules and regulations
"necessary and proper" to enforce any administrative rules and
articles of the Colorado Constitution.
The Court last dealt with CCEG's argument against the ALJ's
determination that its claims against CAD for membership
contribution were groundless. The Court found the ALJ did not err
in finding that the CCEG made no attempts to mitigate the costs
involved in the lawsuit. In addition, the Court held that there was no
error in finding that CCEG, at the time of trial, had no evidence to
support its membership contribution claims.
HOLDING: The Court upheld the AL's holding that CAD violated
FCPA Rule 9.3 and Colorado Constitution Article XXVIII, § 6(1),
because CAD did not disclose the name of the candidate the
electioneering communication referred to and that exempting CAD
from reporting requirements would "frustrate the purpose" of the
Colorado Constitution. The Court further upheld the ALJ's decision
to impose a $1,000 penalty against CAD.
IMPACT: This holding has the potential to increase disclosure in
election communication. Currently, political ads directed at a
particular candidate must be specifically identified as such. In
addition, the public should have search access via the Internet for all
election communications covered under this case. The decision also
represents that great deference to an ALJ is given unless the party
bringing the suit can show a gross abuse of discretion or evident
error.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT
Berkley v. D.C. Transit. Inc., 950 A.2d 749 (D.C. 2008).
LAW: Title 7, § 311 of the District of Columbia Municipal
Regulations provides that a person cannot receive unemployment
compensation if he or she voluntarily leaves his or her job, unless it is
for "good cause connected with the work." There is a presumption
the employee left his or her job involuntarily unless the employer can
prove otherwise. The burden of proof remains on the employer and
not the employee. Section 311.6 provides a list of situations which
do not constitute "good cause connected with the work," including a
minor reduction in salary, transfer to similar work, and general
dissatisfaction with the work being done. Section 311.7 provides
situations which would fulfill the requirement, including racial and
sexual harassment, failure to pay, unsafe working conditions, and
illness and disability caused or made worse by the work.
FACTS: Petitioner, Ruth E. Berkley, filed a request with the District
of Columbia Department of Employment Services (DOES) for
unemployment benefits, which was subsequently denied. Berkley
appealed to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), saying
that her previous employer, D.C. Transit (Transit) issued her a bad
check for services rendered and she was not receiving adequate
hours. OAH scheduled a hearing, at which Transit did not appear
and Berkley appeared pro se. At the beginning of the hearing, the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) informed Berkley that the issues to
be decided were whether the ALJ had jurisdiction to hear the case
and whether Berkley had voluntarily left her job. If she did
voluntarily leave her job, then the question was whether she had good
cause. The ALJ went into a detailed discussion with Berkley of
whether or not she was eligible for unemployment under the D.C.
Municipal Regulations.
The information obtained during Berkley's testimony was that she
received disability benefits from the Social Security Administration
for her disability and that she obtained work with Transit through the
"Ticket to Work" program. She had worked at Transit full-time for
approximately two months when she was involved in a verbal
altercation with a dispatcher. After this altercation, Berkley did not
receive assignments for approximately two weeks. She later returned
to a regular work schedule, of which she seemed to express many
complaints over the quantity and quality of the work that was
provided to her. Berkley also asserted that the reason she left Transit
was because the owner did not have any work for her.
The ALJ held that Berkley had not presented clear and convincing
evidence that she involuntarily left Transit, and that her actions were
not those of a reasonable person in the work place. Moreover, the
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AU noted that Berkley did not take appropriate actions that a
reasonable employee in the work place would take when they were
unsatisfied with the working conditions.
ANALYSIS: Berkley argued that the AU failed to ensure that as a
pro se litigant she truly understood the consequences of testifying, as
well as the law. The Court stated that generally, a pro se litigant is
accorded no special treatment in courts of law. However, there are a
few exceptions, including cases concerning a remedial statute. The
AU does not need to give the pro se litigant tactical advice, but the
AU may have confused Berkley when he stated that "it's initially the
[e]mployer's burden to establish that the [c]laimant voluntarily left
work." This statement may have made it seem like the employer
only had the burden of production in establishing this claim, and not
both the burden of production and persuasion, as they do under the
relevant statute.
The Court distinguished between "voluntarily leaving" and
"voluntarily quitting." The Court again emphasized that there is a
presumption in favor of the employee leaving his job involuntarily,
unless the employer could convince the Court that the employee left
voluntarily. In order to assess whether an employee left voluntarily,
the Court or AU must consider all of the circumstances surrounding
the employee's decision to leave. In this case, the Court held that the
AU did not effectively deal with all of the surrounding
circumstances. There is a category under involuntary termination
that deals with the "quit or stay-and-be-miserable" as well as an
exception under "quit or be fired." 'Either of these two exceptions
could have been applied to Berkley because she was not receiving
adequate hours. Thus, she received an inadequate salary and was
highly dissatisfied and unhappy with her working conditions. The
Court found that the AL's findings were not supported by
substantial evidence in the record.
In determining whether Berkley was entitled to unemployment
compensation, the ALJ must decide whether a reasonable person
would have taken the same actions in similar circumstances. The
Court held that a reasonable person would take the same actions if his
or her work hours were substantially reduced, as Berkley's were here.
Even though Berkley's testimony may have been confusing, she
repeatedly emphasized that she was not receiving enough hours and
tried to offer unauthenticated evidence to this point.
HOLDING: The Court held that Berkley was prejudiced by the
ALJ's confusing explanation of the required burden of proof and that
there was not substantial evidence on the record to show whether or
not Berkley left for good cause connected with the work. The Court
remanded the case to the OAH.
IMPACT: This case has increased an employer's burden of proof in
an unemployment compensation case, since the burden of proof that
the statute requires was strictly enforced. Also, greater leeway may
be given to a pro se litigant who is unfairly treated in an
unemployment compensation case and whose testimony and
presentment of evidence is not given proper review by the ALJ
presiding over the case.
INDIANA STATE COURT
MicroVote Gen. Corp. v. Office of the Sec'y of State, 890 N.E.2d
21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
LAW: Indiana Code § 4-21.5 - 5-13 provides that any party who
wishes to seek judicial review of an administrative agency action
must transmit documents within thirty days including the agency
record, all documents used by the agency in its deliberations, and any
other material used in agency actions of the type at issue. An
extension of time may be granted to the seeking party for good cause.
FACTS: An Administrative Law Judge for the office of the Indiana
Secretary of State determined that MicroVote General Corporation
(MicroVote) had violated Indiana election law and advised that a
penalty of $250,000 be assessed against MicroVote, as well as
additional costs of $133,562.25. Secretary Rokita approved both the
penalty and additional costs. An Indiana trial court granted the
Secretary's motion to dismiss MicroVote's petition for judicial
review.
ANALYSIS: Even though MicroVote was only appealing questions
of law, the Court rejected MicroVote's argument that they did not
Fall 2008 Legal Summaries
740 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 28-2
need to present the entire agency hearing record. The Court stated
that only documents which would be deemed vital to the agency
decision must be presented to the court. The Court also addressed
MicroVote's argument that the Secretary's misconduct or an alleged
filing error by the trial court caused the filing of the agency record to
be late. The Court recognized that the party alleging estoppel must
bear the burden of proof and held that MicroVote did not meet this
burden. Furthermore, the Court stated that even if the trial court
committed a filing error, it would not be a sufficient basis for
estoppel. The Court rejected MicroVote's argument that it should be
precluded from filing the agency record within thirty days because
the agency record itself was not completed or finalized. The Court
said that this was an insufficient argument because even if this was
the case, MicroVote should have filed a timely extension with the
Court.
HOLDING: The Indiana Court of Appeals held that relief was
precluded by MicroVote's failure to timely file the agency record or
to request a time extension to file the record. Additionally,
MicroVote could not invoke the doctrine of estoppel as an excuse to
either timely file the agency record or to file the time extension.
IMPACT: The Court provided some leeway in what a party
appealing an administrative agency action had to supply in order to
seek judicial review of the action. Thus, the entire agency record
may not be needed, only those parts which are relevant to the
decision.
MASSACHUSETTS STATE COURT
Ciampi v. Comm'r of Corrs., 892 N.E.2d 270 (Mass. 2008).
LAW: Massachusetts General Laws chapter 124, § 1 and chapter
127, § 33 state that the Massachusetts Commissioner of Corrections
(Commissioner) has the ability to make and enforce rules and
regulations which are incident to his other statutorily granted powers,
including those necessary for safety and discipline within the state
correctional facilities. In addition, the Commissioner may use "all
necessary and proper means" to maintain order and enforce
obedience within the correctional facilities. Further, title 103, §
430.09 (2006) of the Code of Massachusetts Regulations provides
that when the Commissioner determines restitution is the appropriate
sanction for an inmate, he must provide the inmate with an itemized
list of costs and damages associated with the misconduct.
Additionally, title 103, § 405.17 of the Code of Massachusetts
Regulations provides that if an inmate receives a sanction of
restitution, the inmate may subsequently consent to the amount of the
sanction being deducted from his prison account. If the inmate
refuses, the Superintendent may order the account be debited for up
to one-half the amount of the sanction, or all of the sanction, if the
prisoner is serving a life sentence or is a "sexually dangerous
person."
FACTS: On September 13, 2002, a correctional officer searched
plaintiff Dennis A. Ciampi's cell and found a bottle of what appeared
to be home-brewed alcohol. Ciampi received a disciplinary report.
If Ciampi was found guilty, then he may be required to pay $144 for
the costs associated with the drug testing of controlled substances.
Later that same day, a urine test performed on Ciampi tested positive
for alcohol, which resulted in a second disciplinary report. Ciampi
was notified when his disciplinary hearing would take place, as well
as given a copy of all of the relevant reports (including the two
disciplinary reports, the results of the drug test, and a notice dealing
with the reimbursement of the costs of drug testing). The
disciplinary hearing resulted in Ciampi having to pay restitution costs
for the drug testing. Money was withdrawn from his prison account
to pay these costs. The trial judge found that Ciampi had a protected
property interest in his prison account and granted Ciampi's motion
for summary judgment.
ANALYSIS: The Court analyzed whether the Commissioner had
exceeded his scope of authority. The Court acknowledged that
proper deference should be given to a "properly promulgated
regulation." Ciampi argued that because Massachusetts law
specifically stated several instances in which deductions are to be
made from an inmate's account, the statute may not be read more
broadly to include non-enumerated situations. The Court disagreed,
stating that because of the broad grant of authority given to the
Commissioner, a statute or rule will be upheld so long as it has a
reasonably close relationship to the grant of powers. In this case, the
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rule ordering for the debiting of the prisoner's account is rationally
related to the stated goals of the Commissioner, including: to deter
future impermissible conduct, to protect the prison staff, and to hold
the prisoner responsible for his actions. The regulation at issue here
is reasonably related to the overall goal of maintaining safety and
discipline in prisons; therefore, the regulation met the central goal of
the Commissioner, which was to maintain internal security within the
prison system.
The Court also recognized that an express grant of powers
automatically carries with it all incidental authority necessary to
effectively and efficiently carry out all powers under the grant of
powers. The Court turned to Ciampi's argument that his "protected
property interest" was violated when the Commissioner withdrew the
funds from his prison account. Due process is owed to every person
before they can be deprived of "life, liberty or property." Courts in
the past have recognized that prisoners have a statutorily protected
interest in their prison accounts and at a minimum, notice and an
opportunity for a hearing must be given before he is deprived of a
protected property interest. Ciampi was given written, advance
warning of the disciplinary hearing, and during this hearing he was
allowed to call witnesses, present evidence, and make a statement on
his own behalf. Thus, there was no violation of his right to due
process.
HOLDING: The Court entered summary judgment for the
defendant. The Court reasoned that Ciampi did not suffer a violation
of due process for the deprivation of his property (his prison account)
because he was given written notice of a disciplinary hearing, and a
hearing was held in which he could present evidence, call witnesses,
and make a statement on his own behalf.
IMPACT: This case holds that administrative agency regulations
are to be given deference when their purported purpose is even
loosely related to the statute which gives them their power. This may
allow the Commissioner here to extend his powers, using the broad
reason that it is being done in order to promote safety or discipline in
correctional facilities.
OKLAHOMA STATE COURT
Ashikian v. State, 188 P.3d 148 (Okla. 2008).
LAW: Oklahoma Horse Racing Commission Rule 325:1-1-7
establishes the limits of the Blue Ribbons Board of Stewards'
(Stewards) jurisdiction to suspend licensing benefits or impose fines.
Their jurisdiction over a matter begins seventy-two hours before
entries are taken for the first race on the first day and extends thirty
days past the close of the race meetings. If a controversy arises
during this time, an extension may be granted for a reasonable time
period. Oklahoma Horse Racing Commission Rule 325:70-1-23
further provides that a party served with notice must, in turn, serve a
notice to appeal within three calendar days of receipt of the notice,
unless the Commission allows an extension for good cause. The
Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act, 75 O.S.2001 § 250 et seq.
provides the procedures by which a judicial review of an agency's
action will be taken, including a time provision of thirty days
following the service of a final agency action.
FACTS: Plaintiff Cynthia Ashikian was issued a horse racing
license by the Oklahoma Horse Racing Commission and raced horses
at the Blue Ribbons Race Track until her license was due to expire.
The racetrack claimed Ashikian owed it money for stall rental and
sent her a letter informing her of the debt. Ashikian never paid the
debt and the Stewards sent her notice regarding the track's financial
policy. Ashikian failed to appear and the notice was not forwarded to
her at her new address. The Stewards declared her in default and
issued an order suspending her ability to be licensed as a horse racer
until the financial obligation had been resolved. The following year,
Ashikian applied and was granted a horse racing license in Iowa.
Soon after the Iowa license was granted, she learned about the action
being taken against her in Oklahoma. Ashikian promptly paid the
amount due and was restored to good standing with the Oklahoma
Horse Racing Commission (OHRC). When the Iowa Board of
Stewards learned of the Oklahoma action, they demanded Ashikian
to return all prize money she had won in Iowa. Ashikian filed suit,
alleging that the Stewards' order lacked jurisdiction and also that she
had never received notice of the pending action. The OHRC and the
Stewards filed a motion to dismiss Ashikian's claims, and Ashikian
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then filed a motion for summary judgment, again alleging that the
Steward's action lacked jurisdiction.
ANALYSIS: The Court first recognized the principle that apart from
a timely filing of judicial review, a final order from OHRC cannot be
attacked. However, when jurisdiction appears to be absent, the order
may be set aside. The burden is on the party seeking to invalidate the
order. The Court stated that the only information Ashikian provided
was the dates of when notice was originally given and when OHRC
issued its final notice. OHRC argued that these dates were not part of
the administrative record and that this information appeared outside
of the four comers of the record, thus, making it insufficient to
declare a lack of jurisdiction. The Court, however, stated that the
information needed to establish the lack of jurisdiction was contained
within material supplied by OHRC. This material became part of the
administrative record. After the Court determined what materials
could be submitted to establish a lack of jurisdiction, the Court
addressed whether the Stewards' jurisdiction would automatically
extend if no timely notice to extend was filed. The Court rejected
this argument outright, stating that an administrative agency may not
confer any greater power on a subordinate arm of its agency than the
agency itself possesses. Because OHRC may not exercise unlimited
jurisdiction for an infinite amount of time, the Stewards may not
either.
HOLDING: The Court held that the Stewards did not have
jurisdiction to issue the order in Iowa, even though they had authority
under relevant Oklahoma legislation. They also ruled that the trial
court's award of trial fees was unsupported by any legal authority.
Thus, the Court overturned the award to Ashikian.
IMPACT: The case limits the authority of subordinate arms of a
ruling agency. Furthermore, an agency cannot bestow greater powers
upon its subordinate arms than it has itself. Thus, any attempt by a
ruling agency to extend its own powers through its subordinate arms
will be ruled invalid.
